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Abstract—Smart grid adopts two-way communication and rich functionalities to gain a positive impact on the sustainability and
efficiency of power usage, but on the other hand, also poses serious challenges to customers’ privacy. Existing solutions in smart grid
usually use cryptographic tools, such as homomorphic encryption, to protect individual privacy, which, however, can only support
limited and simple functionalities. Moreover, the resource-constrained smart meters need to perform heavy asymmetric cryptography in
these solutions, which is not applied to smart grid. In this paper, we present a practical and secure SGX-enabled smart grid system,
named SecGrid. Our system leverage trusted hardware SGX to ensure that grid utilities can efficiently execute rich functionalities on
customers’ private data, while guaranteeing their privacy. With the designed security protocols, the SecGrid only require the smart
meters to perform AES encryption. Security analysis shows that SecGrid can thwart various attacks from malicious adversaries.
Experimental results show that SecGrid is much faster than the existing privacy-preserving schemes in smart grid.
Index Terms—Smart Grid, Intel SGX, Data Aggregation, Dynamic Pricing, Load Forecasting, Security, Privacy.
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1 INTRODUCTION
SMART grid integrates various information and commu-nication technologies to achieve efficient and reliable
power generation, transmission, distribution, and control
[1], [2], [3]. Each house will be equipped with a smart meter,
which collects customers’ interval data (typically minute-
level or second-level power usage profile) for billing or
analyzing purpose. On the one hand, these fine-grained
data are used to enable real time analysis, such as dynamic
pricing [4], [5] and load forecasting [6], [7]. On the other
hand, this information raises privacy concerns because it
reveals important personal information and can lead to
various cyberattacks [8], [9]. For example, attackers can
derive the appliance usage patterns of the householders
from fine-grained energy usage profile [10].
To prevent customers’ fine-grained data from disclo-
sure, secure data aggregation schemes [11], [12], [13] have
been proposed to aggregate overall power usage data. In
these schemes, each smart meter encrypts data using ho-
momorphic cryptography, such as Paillier [14] and BGN
[15], then reports the ciphertext to a gateway. The gateway
will compute the aggregation result on ciphertext and then
report the result to control center for further analysis. Data
aggregation guarantees that only overall power usage data
will be known by others, thereby protecting customers’
privacy. However, some important tools, such as dynamic
pricing and load forecasting, which can be used to ensure
grid system’s stability and reliability, require the grid util-
ities to compute on customers’ fine-grained data. Dynamic
pricing is used to charge customers with dynamic prices
based on their real time usage. To realize it in a privacy-
preserving way, the existing schemes, like the one in [4],
use homomorphic encryption and sophisticated design. As
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for load forecasting, so far, no one has designed a practical
privacy-preserving scheme for it due to the need of complex
operations.
Although utilizing homomorphic encryption can real-
ize data aggregation and dynamic pricing in a privacy-
preserving way, it brings a heavy computation overhead to
the grid utilities, especially for resource-constrained smart
meters [16], [17]. Furthermore, many useful tools, like load
forecasting, are less likely to be implemented efficiently with
privacy protection in the same way. In addition, if we want
to realize multiple tools in one system, the computation
overhead will be even higher. We refer to these tools (i.e.,
data aggregation, dynamic pricing, load forecasting, etc.) as
functionalities.
In general, it is a trade-off between rich functionali-
ties and strong privacy protection, as it is very hard to
achieve both of the features simultaneously. However, in
this paper, we accomplish both by our novel design. We
present SecGrid, a secure and efficient smart grid system
that possesses the properties of privacy preservation and
rich functionalities. Our security model considers malicious
adversaries who may control the software and even the OS
of the whole grid utilities (including gateways and control
center) except for the certified physical processors involved
in the computation. In SecGrid, the resource-constrained
smart meters only need to perform AES encryption, and
the gateways can perform rich functionalities with high
efficiency in a privacy-preserving way. In fact, our system
can be treated as a framework, as any functionality that can
be implemented obliviously is compatible with SecGrid.
Our main contribution is the design, implementation,
and evaluation of this practical smart grid system. We use
SGX processor, which is Intel’s trusted hardware capability
[18], as a building block. Indeed, SGX does not guarantee
to secure everything, and we need to cope with many
challenges not addressed by the hardware. The first is to
establish a secret key between a smart meter and a gateway.
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2Since smart meter is resource-constrained, it cannot perform
heavy cryptographic schemes, such as Diffie-Hellman key
exchange and asymmetric encryption [19], [20]. To solve this
problem, a user device is introduced to participate in the
initialization phase of a smart meter, which can only interact
once with smart meter to complete the key exchange.
The second challenge is to guarantee data integrity for
the smart meters’ reports. Since SGX has no non-volatile
storage, the customers’ reports that need to be stored in
the storage of gateway, may be tampered, removed or
rolled back by a malicious software or compromised OS
[21], [22]. The existing solutions guaranteeing integrity in
such case either bring heavy overhead or are not suitable
for smart grid architecture [23], [24]. We thus propose a
lightweight integrity guaranteed method for SecGrid. This
method is inspired by count increment technique of literature
[25]. During the processing of gateway, every report will be
encrypted together with unique count and nonce, and the
monotonicity and freshness of which will be verified in our
proposed periodic report protocol.
The next challenge is to protect the data inside the iso-
lated memory regions from attacks due to unsafe memory
accesses. SGX provides the isolated memory regions for the
programs, and thus unsafe implementation of programs can
easily leak data or suffer from other attacks. By “unsafe”
here means that the implemented codes may have memory
access patterns or control flows that depend on the values
of sensitive data. We thus provide the safe implementations
of three functionalities, namely, data aggregation, dynamic
pricing, and load forecasting, to show how the functionali-
ties can be securely supported in SecGrid. Other challenges,
such as time synchronization, gateway restart protection,
etc., are also solved in our system. In summary we make
the following contributions:
• We present SecGrid, a practical smart grid system sup-
porting rich functionalities while guaranteeing customers’
privacy. In our design, the smart meters only need to
perform AES encryption instead of heavy cryptography.
• Our system is compatible with any functions that can be
implemented obliviously in smart grid. To better present
our system, we implement three commonly used func-
tions, namely data aggregation, dynamic pricing, and load
forecasting, with strong data obliviousness.
• The security analysis indicates that our design is secure
against malicious adversaries. Also, the experimental re-
sults show that the proposed protocols can be completed
efficiently, and the runtime of three functions has around
103× improvement compared with existing solutions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2
enumerates the related works of Intel SGX and rich func-
tionalities in smart grid. Then we present some preliminar-
ies of our system in Section 3. In Section 4, we introduce our
system model and security model. We illustrate protocols
in detail about initialization, periodic report and gateways
restart in Section 5, followed by implementation of functions
in Section 6. In Section 7 and 8, we analyze the security
of our design and evaluate the performance respectively.
Finally, Section 9 makes a conclusion.
2 RELATED WORK
2.1 Functionalities for Smart Grid
To enable rich functionalities in smart grid, customers’ con-
sumption data need to be collected for analysis. However,
customers’ privacy may be leaked out unconsciously dur-
ing the procedures. To guarantee privacy and also enable
functions carried out in smart grid at the same time, many
cryptography-driven schemes have been proposed. One
popular privacy-preserving mechanism is secure data ag-
gregation [11], [12], [13], which aggregates customers’ con-
sumption data of a specific region through homomorphic
encryption. Another widely researched topic is dynamic
pricing [26], [27], [28]. However, privacy protection schemes,
like the one in [4], can only handle simple pricing models
with cryptography tools. Some real time pricing models [5]
are not likely to realize efficiently in a privacy preserving
way. Other famous functions, such as load forecasting [6],
[29], [30], that are very useful to improve the grid’s perfor-
mance, also suffer the same problem.
2.2 Intel SGX
Intel SGX provides isolated execution spaces, named en-
claves. Programs in enclaves can process data in plaintext.
But any software or even the OS on the same platform,
cannot observe the data content inside enclaves [31], [32].
Ohrimenko et al. [31] showed how to outsource model
training to untrusted servers. To make memory accesses
data-independent, which is not protected by SGX, their
system uses padding and other tricks to hide access pattern.
VC3 [32] implemented MapReduce in distributed servers
with confidentiality and verifiability. Opaque [33] is an
encrypted data analytics platform over Spark SQL, which
uses oblivious sorting for data processing in an encrypted
database. Iron [34] implements some interesting but heavy
primitives in cryptography. The SGX implementations are
efficient and practical. The access pattern, not protected by
SGX, is hidden by oblivious comparison functions. Town
Crier [35] is a work that provides authenticated data feed
from external trusted sources for smart contracts. ZeroTrace
[23] provides an oblivious data storage system from SGX to
access external storage, which minimizes the response time.
3 PRELIMINARIES
3.1 Enclaves in SGX
SGX refers to Intel Software Guard Extension, a set of CPU
extensions, which can provide isolated execution environ-
ments, named enclaves, to protect the confidentiality and
integrity of the data against all other software, even a com-
promised OS, on the platform. When a platform is equipped
with a SGX-enabled CPU (such as the gateways and control
center in our system), in addition to the enclave, the mem-
ory, BIOS, I/O and even power are treated as potentially
untrusted. The general processing flow in enclave is shown
in Fig. 1. The encrypted data firstly will be transmitted into
enclave for decryption. Then the decrypted data will be the
input of some function f . Finally, the output of f will be
encrypted and then sent to the outside of the enclave.
SGX provides two core operations, sealing and remote
attestation, which will be used in our system. Sealing is
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Fig. 1. General processing flow in enclave
for storing data securely outside of the enclave. Remote
attestation is for a remote party to verify the legitimacy of the
enclave (i.e., the enclave is created by a legal SGX-capable
CPU and the code is correctly loaded in the enclave). The
details are as follows:
• Sealing. Each SGX-capable CPU has a hardware-
protected sealed key called Root Seal Key that cannot
be stolen or forged. An enclave can derive a Seal Key
from the Root Seal Key using instruction EGETKEY. This
key is specific to the enclave, and other enclaves cannot
derive the same key. But the same enclave can always
get this key even if it is destroyed and restarted. Seal Key
is used to encrypt and authenticate data stored outside
of the enclave.
• Remote attestation. SGX allows a remote party to check
whether the code is correctly loaded in an enclave.
When an enclave is created, the CPU will generate a
hash of the state of the loaded code and static data,
known as measurement, and a report that contains the
measurement and optional self-defined data (e.g. a new
generated public key). Then the software that created
the enclave can ask for a quote, which consists of a report
and its signature signed with a hardware-protected
attestation key. Remote parties can verify the quote by
contacting the Intel Attestation Server. Such procedure
is known as remote attestation. The detailed operations
can be found in [18].
3.2 Attacks against Enclave
The protection of SGX is restricted in CPU. Although data
are encrypted, the memory access patterns may leak the
privacy of data inside enclave [23]. Branches in program
like if-else make data-dependent running patterns, and
enclaves that are running such programs suffer from cache-
timing attack [31], [32]. Access to storage outside enclave
exposes address to a PCI-e bus listener or an operating
system (OS), who can create page faults. Furthermore, if the
address is data-dependent, there will be page-fault attacks
[22], [23].
Also, rollback attack breaks the freshness of external
data [24]. Some data that requires a long-term preservation
should reside in persistent storage, like disk. These data can
be rolled back to a previous version by a compromised OS.
For example, replacing the reported power usage data at
time slot t with t−1. In preventing rollback attack, integrity
guarantee from Merkle tree [23] fails when the platform
is restarted, while other methods are either too heavy or
unable to be applied to smart grid architecture [24], [32].
Smart Meter
User Device
SGX-capable CPU
Gateway
Control Center
Fig. 2. System Architecture
Therefore, we need to develop new approach in our design
to prevent such attack.
4 SYSTEM MODEL AND SECURITY MODEL
4.1 System Model
Our system adopts the typical architecture of smart grid,
which is shown in Fig. 2. It contains a control center,
gateways in residential area, smart meters and user devices
in home area. Control center and gateways are able to create
enclaves, called the control enclave and the gateway enclave,
respectively.
Control Center (CC). CC collects data and responds to
requests from/to each gateway. It has a enclave, called
control enclave. CC also has all the initialization keys of smart
meters (Kiinit for each smart meter i). These keys are used in
the initialization phase of smart meters, and can be accessed
by the control enclave. To prevent the CC or other potential
attackers from knowing the smart meter’s key, the control
enclave takes Merkle tree based techniques to access these
keys.
Gateways (GW). A GW runs a secure enclave, called gate-
way enclave, which directly collects and processes the data
reported by smart meters. Many functionalities, such as data
aggregation, dynamic pricing, and load forecasting, can be
performed inside the gateway enclave. The gateway enclave
can establish shared keys with smart meters with the help
of user device.
Smart Meters (SM). Every house is equipped with a SM
to collect the power usage data and report the encrypted
data to gateway enclave periodically, e.g., every 15 minutes.
Considering the constrained resource of smart meter, the
only cipher used here is AES-GCM used to guarantee both
confidentiality and integrity of data. Each SM contains an
initialization key Kiinit that is used to establish a new secret
key Ki between the SM and the gateway enclave.
User Devices (UD). A user needs a device to help his/her
SM establish a secret key with gateway enclave in the ini-
tialization phase. The device can be a smartphone that is
installed with an official application so that it can participate
in the initialization of a new SM. UD has sufficient comput-
ing capability to run asymmetric cryptography algorithms
and verify remote attestation.
44.2 Security Model
We assume that a malicious adversary who can control all
the software, including the OS, in the CC and GW, tries to
violate the confidentiality and integrity of customers’ private
data by performing the following attacks. The adversary
can read, block, modify, and replay all messages sent by/to
a secure enclave. The adversary is also able to observe
memory access pattern and infer control flow in an enclave
process, i.e., launching side-channel attacks. In particular,
the adversary may perform rollback attack, that is, to replace
the sealed data with a previous version.
We assume that the adversary cannot compromise the
secure enclaves and the relevant enclave keys (e.g. SealKey
and attestation key). The adversary cannot break crypto-
graphic primitives used in our system, i.e AES-GCM, Diffie-
Hellman key exchange, etc. Compromising the user device,
denial-of-service and physical attacks, such as power analy-
sis, are out of the scope of this paper.
The adversary is assumed to not want to trigger alarm.
Although the adversary can perform various attacks, he/she
does not want to be detected by the smart grid system.
5 SYSTEM DESIGN
5.1 Overview
Our goal is to guarantee customers’ privacy while enabling
rich functionalities in smart grid. Rich functionalities refer
to various demand side management functionalities that
process customers’ private data to improve the grid’s per-
formance. These rich functionalities are hard to realized
efficiently by cryptography-based schemes.
In SecGrid, a GW runs rich functionalities inside the gate-
way enclave. To prevent side-channel attacks, these function-
alities should not contain data-dependent operations, that
is, they need to be implemented obliviously. We discuss the
possible leakage that may be introduced by three popular
functionalities, namely, data aggregation, dynamic pricing,
and load forecasting, and provide the secure implementa-
tions, which will be described in Section 6.
To guarantee the confidentiality and integrity of input
and output data of rich functionalities, in SecGrid, we
develop a new periodic report protocol to secure the trans-
mission and storage of customers’ private data. Each SM’s
reported data is encrypted using AES-GCM, and contains
two new parameters, nonce and ctr. These parameters are
carefully used to resist various attacks, such as replay attack
and rollback attack, which, however, require more complex
measures to prevent in other solutions. The secret key used
in this protocol is established by our proposed initialization
protocols for SMs and GWs. Considering the robustness of
our system and preventing the adversaries from restarting
the gateway enclave, we propose a status restoring protocol
for GW, which can avoid data loss due to the restart of GW
or gateway enclave.
5.2 CC/GW Initialization
This initialization phase involves the control enclave and
gateway enclave. The control enclave will be initialized at the
system setup, and when the gateway enclave starts to work,
it will interact with the control enclave to authenticate each
other as well as share symmetric/asymmetric keys and time
information.
The initialization protocol is shown in Fig. 3. These
six steps can be divided into two stages: Attest and Key
Exchange and Time Sync. During the first stage, the gateway
enclave and the control enclave attest each other through
remote attestation, and then use Diffie-Hellman key exchange
to share a secret key. In the second stage, the control enclave
synchronizes its time to the gateway enclave as well as con-
firms the shared keys. The details are shown as follows.
Stage 1 [Attest and Key Exchange]
1© The gateway enclave generates a public/private key pair
(PKgw, SKgw) for a CCA2-secure public key cryptosys-
tem.
2© The gateway enclave sends its remote attestation message
to the control enclave, which contains PKgw and a gener-
ated Diffie-Hellman parameter ga.
3© Upon receiving the remote attestation, the control enclave
verifies its legitimacy (the detailed verification phase
of remote attestation is described in Section 3.1). Then,
it generates another Diffie-Hellman parameter gb, and
sends back its remote attestation message containing
PKcc, gb and the current wall-clock time.
Stage 2 [Time Sync. and Confirm ]
4© Once the message is received, the gateway enclave records
the received time as reference time and starts the time
counter from 0. After verifying the remote attestation,
the gateway enclave obtains the time: the reference time
plus the value of the time counter. Then, it encrypts the
time with gab and signs the ciphertext with SKgw. The
gateway enclave sends the ciphertext and the signature to
the control enclave.
5© The control enclave verifies the signature with PKgw,
decrypts the ciphertext with gab, and then compares the
time with local time. If all the verifications succeed, the
control enclave will seal gab, and return an ack message,
which is encrypted using gab and signed using SKcc.
6© Upon receiving the ack, the gateway enclave verifies the
signature using PKcc and decrypts the ciphertext using
gab. Then, it seals gab and PKcc.
Gateway
Enclave
Control
Enclave
genKeyPair() ; 
 
gw
aRemoteATT(PK g )
cc
bRemoteATT(PK g time)
 
verify attestation ;
generate DH parameter ;
abseal(g ) ;
 
Echo(time)
Ack(time)
 
verify Echo ;
 
seal(time) ;
initialize TimeCount to 0 ;
abseal(g ) ;
Request
Response
generate keys ;
initialize time ;
record time & start count ;
generate Echo ;
verify Ack ;
Fig. 3. CC/GW initialization protocol.
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triggerInit() ;
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Response
RequestATT() ;
verify() ;
genKey() ;
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Device
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getInitKey()
retInitKey()
 
get_key();
Done
Echo(nonce)
Ack(nonce+1)
verify() ;
seal() ;
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Fig. 4. The SM initialization protocol.
5.3 SM Initialization Protocol
The first time when a customer accesses the smart grid,
he/she first installs an official applications on UD to initial-
ize his/her SM. The SM initialization protocol is as shown
in Fig. 4. This protocol can be triggered by the UD or the
customer manually. We take the initialization of the i-th SM
as an example in the following description. The initialization
phase can be divided into three stages: Attestation, Key
Establishment, and Confirm. The UD will verify the legiti-
macy of the gateway enclave according to its remote attestation.
The second stage is used to establish a secret key between
the SM and the gateway enclave, where the UD is used as a
bridge. The SM has a sealed initialization key Kiinit, which is
also known by the control enclave. To enable the secure use
of Kiinit, we utilize Merkle tree based method, proposed in
ZeroTrace [23], to guarantee integrity and freshness. Note
that, after the following procedures, a fresh nonce will be
securely obtained by the SM, and it will be used as one of
the parameters in the first report of the SM.
One significant problem is how the SM sends initializa-
tion message to the UD. We can utilize existing solutions
such as ZigBee based communication protocol (used in
OG&E company [20]) to achieve this purpose.
Stage 1 [UD←GE, Attestation]
1© UD starts and requests a remote attestation from the
gateway enclave.
2© The gateway enclave returns its remote attestation message,
which contains PKgw, to the UD.
3© Upon receiving the remote attestation, the UD verifies it,
and then triggers the initialization phase of the SM.
Stage 2 [SM↔GE, Key Establishment]
4© The SM starts the initialization phase. It first generates a
new random key Ki, and then encrypts this key and its
identifier IDi with sealed initialization key Kiinit. After
that, the SM sends the Init message to the UD, where
Init = IDi||EKiinit(IDi||Ki).
(To be noted, the Init message does not need to be pro-
tected from eavesdropping since it has been encrypted.
We will analyze this in detail in Section 7.4).
5© The UD encrypts the IDi in Init message using PKgw
to generate new Init′ message, and sends it to the
gateway enclave: Init′ = EˆPKgw(Init).
6© The gateway enclave extracts the IDi with SKgw, gener-
ates a getInitKey() message containing the IDi encrypted
with gab, and then sends it to the control enclave.
7© Upon receiving the message, the control enclave decrypts
it and extracts the IDi. Then, the control enclave obtains
the corresponding Kiinit, void this key and then returns
it after encryption.
8© The gateway enclave can decrypt the Kiinit, and obtain
the Ki from Init′ with it. The gateway enclave returns
a Done message to the UD to notify the initialization
has succeeded, and an Echo message to the SM, which
contains an encrypted nonce using Ki.
Stage 3 [SM↔GE, Confirm]
9© The SM decrypts the Echo message, and sets the local
time to time. Then, the SM returns an Ack message to
the gateway enclave. This message contains the encrypted
nonce + 1.
10© The gateway enclave verifies the Ack message, and then
seals the Ki with IDi as associated data in AES-GCM.
5.4 Periodic Report Protocol
When the initialization phase is done, the SM shares a
symmetric key with the gateway enclave, which will be
used to secure the report data. In order to ensure the data
integrity and prevent replay attack, we enable an monotonic
counter ctr, which starts from 0, in SM to indicate different
reports. Due to the continuity of the SM’s reports, our use
of ctr can resist rollback attack, which will be proved in
our security analysis. Another parameter nonce is also used
here to guarantee the freshness of reports. Considering that
the freshness verification needs the gateway enclave to store
every nonce, which is difficult since SGX has no permanent
storage, we make clever use of cyclical nature of the reports.
By letting the gateway enclave randomly choose the nonce
for the SM to use in the next report, we avoid the storage of
each nonce. The protocol proceeds as follows:
1© When the i-th SM needs to report, it first increases the
counter ctri = ctri + 1, and then generate the report
ri = IDi||EKi(IDi||mi||nonce||ctri), where nonce is
sent by the gateway enclave during last report period.
The SM reports ri.
2© Upon receiving the report, the gateway enclave decrypts
the report with its sealed key Ki, and extracts data mi,
nonce, and ctri. Next, the gateway enclave verifies the
correctness of nonce and obtains last counter ctroldi
from storage, and then checks if ctri = ctroldi + 1.
If all passed, the gateway enclave will seal ri and process
mi with predefined functions. Otherwise, an error or
attack may happen, the gateway enclave will report this
alarm to CC immediately. Finally, based on the outputs
of functions, the gateway enclave generates a report for
CC and a response for the SM.
3© The control enclave can process these reports in the same
way as what the gateway enclave does, and generate a
response.
One key challenge of above protocol is how to design
and program the functions executed inside the enclaves to
6prevent privacy leakage. As we illustrate before, SGX is not
perfectly secure. For example, software-based side channel
attacks can violate the data confidentiality even if the data is
inside the gateway enclave. So we should take fully account
of the secure design and implementation of these functions.
We will discuss this issue in Section 6.
5.5 GW Restart Protocol
When a gateway enclave restarts, it needs to restore its pre-
vious state. At restart, the gateway enclave may lose new
reports that have not been sealed in the last report period.
So it needs to requests these reports from the corresponding
SMs. Also, it will obtain fresh time from the control enclave.
The protocol proceeds as follows:
1© The gateway enclave unseals Ki, SKgw, PKgw, PKcc,
gab and all latest sealed reports from storage. If the
unsealing procedure fails, the alarm will be triggered.
Otherwise, the gateway enclave sends request to all SMs
to ask for report (containing new nonces for each SM)
as well as to the control enclave to ask for time.
2© a. Each SM returns its latest report to the gateway
enclave.
b. The control enclave returns current time to the gateway
enclave.
3© Upon receiving responses, the gateway enclave verifies
the time then sets the local time. Then it checks the
freshness of nonces and if ctri in each report satisfies
ctri = ctr
old
i or ctri = ctr
old
i + 1. If all passed,
the gateway enclave restores successfully. Otherwise, the
restore phase may encounter a problem, and the gateway
enclave will trigger alarm to notify grid administrators.
6 FUNCTIONS
The protocols have secured the data submission from SMs
to the gateway enclave and the control enclave. However, the
data processing inside enclaves, i.e. the execution of func-
tions, may have data-dependent operations and is subject
to side-channel attacks [31], [33], [34]. Programs in enclaves
should be oblivious, and therefore we describe the oblivious
implementation of data aggregation, dynamic pricing, and
load forecasting. In addition, we present how to support
general functions in our system.
6.1 Data Aggregation
Secure data aggregation is used to aggregate overall power
usage of all customers over a timespan as follows:
PowerUsageTarea(t) =
∑
i∈S
t+T−1∑
∆=t
PowerUsagei(∆), (1)
where S is the customer set in this area. Compared with
cryptography-based schemes [11], [13] that uses Paillier or
BGN cryptosystem for homomorphic computation, our sys-
tem only requires symmetric encrypted data for submission
and computation. To make the aggregation oblivious, the
gateway enclave adds up the power usage data with the same
order of the arrival of reports and no additional leakage
exists.
6.2 Dynamic Pricing
Typical dynamic pricing models include Time-of-Use (ToU),
Critical Peak Pricing (CPP), and Real Time Pricing (RTP) [2],
[5]. We here introduce the secure implementation of them.
ToU Electricity prices are different at peak time and at off-
peak time. Peak time prices are higher than off-peak time
for demand control. GW takes the price from a piecewise
function:
PricePerUnit(t) =
{
p if t ∈ off-peak time
p + ∆p if t ∈ at-peak time , (2)
where t is the current time. The dynamic pricing does
not have sensitive patterns, because the condition for the
piecewise function (2) is time t, which is open.
But a secure and reliable time [34], [35] needs extra
efforts, since timestamp in gateway BIOS can be tampered.
As mentioned in Section 5.2, the gateway enclaves can obtain
the time from the control enclave, i.e., gets the time from a
trusted source during initialization.
CPP. Peak time is not fixed. In holidays or the days with
special events, it may not be suitable to use ToU pricing
model, which is generally for regular days. Therefore, CPP
is developed to also handle such case, which can be imple-
mented in a way that is similar to ToU in our system, where
days become the condition of specialized piecewise function
[2], [4].
RTP. Real time pricing schemes allow the grid to charge
customers with the nearest real time price, i.e., the price at
each particular interval of time (e.g. one hour). The price
can be announced one hour or a day ahead. We realize a
day ahead RTP scheme proposed in paper [5] in our system,
in which the grid utility releases the predicted prices of the
next 24 hours.
Let mh denote the reported power usage at hour h, and
the pricing function which depends on three parameters ah,
bh, m0 ≥ 0 be as follows:
RealTimePricing(mh) =
{
ah, if 0 ≤ mh < m0,
bh, if mh ≥ m0.
(3)
In this scheme, m0 is a fixed value, while ah and bh change
every hour and every day. In order to allow customers to
have sufficient time to schedule their electricity consump-
tion, the GW should predict the prices of the next 24 hours
(i.e. 24 ah and bh) and broadcast the prices to the SMs.
Let aˆ[t][h] and bˆ[t][h] denote the predicted parameters for
the upcoming price tariff for each hour h on day t, the
prediction model is formulated as follows:
aˆ[t][h] = k1a[t− 1][h] + k2a[t− 2][h] + k3a[t− 7][h],
bˆ[t][h] = k1b[t− 1][h] + k2b[t− 2][h] + k3b[t− 7][h].
(4)
Note that aˆ[t][h] and bˆ[t][h] are just the predicted parame-
ters. The true values (a[t][h] and b[t][h]) will be known when
the hour h comes, and be used to charge customers. As
the condition for piecewise function is power usage x, the
access pattern of a naı¨ve implementation is data-dependent.
To hide the access pattern, we use oblivious assembly func-
tions O_greater() and O_move() [31], [34]. The function
Real_Time_Pricing in Fig. 5 is executed in the gateway
7enclave, which avoids if-else branches and has no data-
dependent operations. Thus it can thwart aforementioned
side-channel attacks.
float Real_Time_Pricing(int m, float pa, float pb, int m0){
// pa and pb are the real value of a[t][h] and b[t][h]
bool flag = O_greater(m, m0);
//Keep two decimal places of pa and pb
int a = int(pa * 100), b = int(pb * 100);
int p = O_move(flag, a, b);
float bill = (p / 100.0) * m;
return bill;
}
O_greater(x, y) :
    mov rcx, x
    mov rdx, y
    cmp rcx, rdx
    setg al
    retn
O_move(cond, x, y) :
    mov rcx, cond
    mov rdx, x
    mov rax, y
    test rcx, rcx
    cmovz rax, rdx
    retn
Fig. 5. Data oblivious real time pricing function.
6.3 Load Forecasting
Current commonly used load forecasting models include
statistical based model and artificial intelligence based
model [2], [36]. Next, we describe the secure implementation
of stochastic time series method [6] and neural network
based algorithm [36].
Stochastic Time Series. This method uses a fit function to
calculate a prediction of next moment (e.g. hourly) load
from previous records. An example model is [6]:
Load(t) =φ1Load(t− 1) + φ2Load(t− 2)
+ . . .+ φkLoad(t− k) + noise(t). (5)
To realize this model, the cryptography-based methods have
to use computationally expensive homomorphic multiplica-
tion and addition. While in our system, the GW can compute
the predicted load inside the gateway enclave with decrypted
data directly.
Neural Network Neural network based algorithms can
figure out the relationship between referring variables and
power consumption by supervised learning [36]. Referring
variables may include history consumption, day (e.g. holi-
day), and weather (e.g. temperature). Similarly, these data
items are obtained from the control enclave. Compared with
pure cryptography schemes that need to leverage homo-
morphic encryption, we can run oblivious machine learning
algorithms [31] on plaintext data in the gateway enclave.
6.4 General Functions
Besides these three functions we described above, there are
many other functions performed by the grid to improve
the performance. Many of them require customers’ private
data as inputs. All these functions can be denoted as f(x, y),
where x is the privacy-related input, and y is the other input,
such as electricity price, time, and weather conditions.
To perform f(x, y) in a privacy-preserving way, the
enclaves in our system collect x from SMs, and request y
from a trust data source via HTTPS [35]. For example, the
grid administrator can post the latest pricing strategy on a
website, where the public can easily verify and the enclaves
can obtain the data they need. From this prospective, our
SecGrid system is able to support rich functionalities with
privacy protection, and this feature is not available in other
smart grid systems.
7 SECURITY ANALYSIS
Our system, SecGrid, aims to protect customers’ privacy
and execute functions securely against malicious adver-
saries. Specifically, our system should guarantee (1) con-
fidentiality, (2) integrity, and (3) availability. And we will
describe how the various attacks are prevented by our
proposed secure protocols and oblivious operations. In ad-
dition, we analyze the security for the initialization phases,
which are the foundation of our system security.
7.1 Confidentiality
Theorem 1. Customer data from the periodical report protocol
will never leak outside the enclave. Only the outputs of data
aggregation, dynamic pricing, and load forecasting are revealed
to the power grid company.
Proof. Data confidentiality comes from (a) secure commu-
nication protocols for periodic report to hide data on the
fly; (b) oblivious operations in gateway enclave to hide access
pattern.
(a) Outside enclave Periodic reports from SM are encrypted
with AES-GCM under key Ki shared between SM and
GW enclave. This encryption is IND-CCA2 and any p.p.t
adversary cannot break the confidentiality without Ki. For
key establishment, SM and the gateway enclave initialize key
Ki using the protocol of Section 5.3. SM generates the key
and notifies the gateway in Init′ encrypted with PKgw.
Only the gateway enclave can decrypt Init′ and reveal Ki
with CC’s keyring. The sealing of data uses SealKey to
protect confidentiality.
(b) Inside enclave The functions are implemented on the
top of oblivious operations of Section 6. The memory and
execution patterns are no longer data-dependent.
• Data Aggregation. Reports are summed up according to the
order of arrival. The aggregation is independent from the
electricity consumption data in SM reports.
• Dynamic Pricing. ToU and CPP use the piecewise function
but the condition is timestamp, which is not private.
When RTP is used for leveled price, the condition becomes
the usage x which is private. We use oblivious assembly
functions [31], [34] O greater() and O move() to make RTP
function oblivious.
• Load Forecasting. Both regression and neural network sys-
tems leverage oblivious learning algorithms [31].
It shows the confidentiality throughout user data lifecycle.
87.2 Integrity
Theorem 2. Integrity and freshness of periodic reports from SM
are achieved in the secure communication protocol.
Proof. AES-GCM = (K, E ,D) provides existential unforgeabil-
ity. Any p.p.t. adversary A should fail to forge a ciphertext:
AdvexistA,(K,E,D)
def
= Pr
[
sk ← K; y ← AEsk(·) : Dsk(y) 6=⊥
]
≤ ,
whereA should never receive the ciphertext y in return from
the encryption oracle Esk(·). The advantage  is negligible.
The existential unforgeability guarantees the message
originates from SM. To prevent rollback attacks, we use
monotonic GW counter nonce and SM counters ctri to
prevent any steal packet of ctroldi ≤ ctri to forge a packet
for ctri. If a steal report is replayed, gateway enclaves can
trigger an alarm.
Theorem 3. Integrity (and freshness) of the external database in
gateway enclaves and control enclave is guaranteed.
Proof. Gateway enclaves seal Ki and ctri with identifier IDi
as the associated data in AES-GCM. The ciphertext itself
is binded with IDi. We only need to consider rollback
attacks. An attack that changes ctri to a steal value ctrsteali
triggers an alarm to CC because a new packet from i-th
SM with ctri>ctrsteali + 1 indicates the gateway has been
rollbacked.
The control enclave which stores all SM initialization keys
accesses the database with Merkle tree. The root hash is
inside the enclave. During SM initialization, key Kiinit is
labeled as “void” to avoid double registration. This requires
freshness which is guaranteed by Merkle tree and control
enclave.
7.3 Availability
We provide robustness to increase system availability by
the GW restart protocol of Section 5.5. During short-term
abrupt failures, the GW can restart the enclave and recollect
the data feed from control enclave. Lost periodic reports will
be retried upon GW request. If an adversary prevents the
gateway from restarting properly, the gateway enclave can
trigger an alarm.
7.4 Security for Initialization
The security of our system relies on the initialization phases,
including CC/GW initialization and SM initialization. The
initialization of CC and GW is actually the setup of the
gateway enclave and the control enclave. The setup phase of
enclaves is secure according to our security model. There-
fore, the CC/GW initialization cannot be broken by the
adversary.
The UD takes an important role in the SM initialization
phase, which involves four entities, the SM, the UD, the
gateway enclave and the control enclave. As the communica-
tions between enclaves are secure and the SM cannot be
compromised by the adversary, the security for the UD is
essential for the initialization. Due to the limited resource of
the SM, there cannot be a secure channel establish between
the SM and the UD. But, the UD’s role is to forward the
message between the SM and the gateway enclave, and prove
the legitimacy of the gateway enclave for the user. Therefore,
even if the UD is compromised, the adversary cannot break
the system, because he/she has no decryption key and
cannot forge any message.
8 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our proposed
system. We first describe the experimental environment and
performance benchmarks. Then, we evaluate the network-
ing and processing overhead of the proposed protocols.
Finally, experimental results show that the functions imple-
mented in our system represent a significant performance
improvement over the existing cryptography-based solu-
tions.
8.1 Experimental Setup & Performance Benchmarks
TABLE 1
Time complexity of operations on SGX.
Operation Time
Create enclave 5.6 ms
Sealing (0.1 KB) 0.015 ms
Unsealing (0.1 KB) 0.01 ms
Remote Attestation 39 ms
ECDSA signing (0.1 KB) 0.69 ms
ECDSA verification (0.1 KB) 1.21 ms
AES-GCM 128-bit encryption (0.1 KB) 0.0011 ms
AES-GCM 128-bit decryption (0.1 KB) 0.0017 ms
Experimental setup. Our experimental platform runs
Windows10 enterprise on Intel Kaby Lake i5-7500@3.40GHz
processor, with 8 GB RAM and 128 GB SSD. We developed
and compiled our code in Visual Studio 2015 with Intel(R)
SGX SDK 1.8 and Intel(R) SGX PSW 1.8. The asymmetric
cryptography used in our system for signing is 256-bit
ECDSA. We use Diffie-Hellman key exchange to establish
shared keys, and 128-bit AES-GCM for symmetric message
encryption and authentication.
Performance benchmarks. TABLE 1 provides the time
complexity of the basic operations used on SGX. From this
table, we can see that symmetric encryption and decryption
are very fast (less than 1 microsecond). The most expensive
operation is remote attestation. The main reason is that the
verifier needs to interact with Intel Attestation Server via
network.
8.2 Performance of Protocols
The protocol overhead consists of two components: net-
working and processing. Since the size of network packages
in these protocols is relatively small (generally,< 100 bytes),
we only consider the number of communications for the
networking overhead. The processing overhead of each
protocol contains partial operation as cost shown in TABLE
1. The processing and networking overhead of the proposed
protocols are shown in TABLE2.
System initialization protocol. Both gateway enclave and
control enclave need remote attestation, which is the most
expensive operation in this protocol (about 39 ms each). The
protocol requires key exchange between the two enclaves.
We can ignore the computational cost of key generation.
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TABLE 2
Performance of Protocols
SM UD
Gateway
Enclave
Processing
Control
Enclave
Processing
Network
System
Initialization – – 41.8 ms 40.8 ms 4
SM
Initialization ≈ 0 33.3 ms 9.5 ms 1.69 ms 8
Periodic
Report ≈ 0 – 2.7 ms 2.1 ms 4
GW
Restart ≈ 0 – 3.1× n ms < 1 ms n+ 2
The most expensive parts are signing and verifying, which
take 0.69 ms and 1.21 ms respectively. Other operations are
relatively faster, e.g. sealing, which need less than 0.1 ms in
total.
SM initialization protocol. This protocol involves all
four entities in our system. The SM needs to generate
a symmetric key and encrypt the Init message with it.
This procedure takes less than 10µs. The UD verifies the
remote attestation of the gateway enclave and encrypts the
Init′ message with PKgw, which takes about 32 ms and
0.69 ms respectively. The gateway enclave verifies signatures
received from the UD and the control enclave, decrypts Init′,
seals key, and generates a signature of Echo. All of these
operations require only 9.5 ms. The control enclave needs one
signing and a key access procedure, which totally take about
2.1 ms.
Periodic report protocol. SM encrypts every report be-
fore sending it to the gateway enclave, which, as we analyzed
before, requires almost no cost. The gateway enclave needs to
decrypt and seal these reports, and encrypts a new report
for the control enclave as well as a response for the SM. These
operations take about 2.1 ms. We do not include the cost of
executing functions here, which will be fully evaluated in
Section 8.3. The control enclave follows the same steps.
GW restart protocol. Once a GW restarts, the gateway
enclave needs to restart, too. It will send a request to the
control enclave to obtain fresh time, and ask each SM to send
a new report to avoid losing report without sealing. This
procedure requires a gateway enclave to communicate n + 2
times with SM and control enclave. It takes 3.1 ms to process
a report, and the gateway enclave requires n times processing.
8.3 Performance Analysis of Functions
Before the functions being executed, the encrypted data
need to transmit into the gateway enclave from outside. We
test the time complexity of data transmission, the result is
shown in Fig. 6. We can see that the time complexity is very
low, around 1.5 ms per 1000 users.
We implement the three functions mentioned in our
paper, namely, data aggregation, dynamic pricing, and load
forecasting. Existing cryptography-based schemes usually
use Paillier or BGN cryptosystem to realize homomorphic
operations in ciphertext. To compare our implementations
with them, we also implement these three functions with
Paillier and BGN cryptosystem, which are denoted as the
Paillier and the BGN in the following description. Details
are described as follows.
Data aggregation. As shown in Fig. 7, our SecGrid has
the lowest cost among all schemes. When the number of
users is 2000, the time complexity of ours is 0.011 ms, which
is 1100× and 2700× faster than the Paillier and the BGN,
respectively.
Dynamic pricing. We implement two dynamic pricing
algorithms, ToU and RTP. As for Paillier and BGN, we use
fixed-price scheme, i.e., they only need to perform homo-
morphic multiplication, which in fact has less time complex-
ity than existing dynamic pricing schemes. As shown in Fig.
8, the time complexity of our scheme is stable around 1µs,
which is 105× faster than that of the Paillier and the BGN.
Load forecasting. Our load forecasting model is free
from using Paillier and BGN that need to perform homo-
morphic addition and multiplication. From Fig. 9, we can
see that our implementation is 2500× and 7500× faster
than the Paillier and the BGN, respectively, and the time
complexity of our protocol does not increase as the number
of users increases.
In summary, the system and SM initialization can be
finished within 100 ms and 50 ms, respectively, and the
processing of periodic report including three functions can
also be completed within around 3 × n ms, where n is the
number of reports or users. The most expensive operation in
this system is remote attestation, followed by ECDSA sign-
ing and verifying. Other operations usually take less than
10 ms. Overall, compared to cryptography-based solutions,
our SecGrid system has much better performance.
9 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a practical smart grid sys-
tem, named SecGrid, to enable rich functionalities with-
out leakage of customers’ private data. With our system,
smart meters only need to support AES-GCM instead of
heavy complex cryptography. Also, the gateway can use
rich functionalities to process customers’ private data at a
high speed with privacy preserving. We proved that our
design is sufficiently secure against malicious adversaries.
We also implemented SecGrid, and thoroughly evaluate its
performance. The experimental results show that our sys-
tem is very efficient, as the implemented functionalities far
outperform existing solutions in terms of time complexity.
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